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Reversing the Wave: 
The Perverse Effects of Economic Liberalism 
on Human Rights
UMUT KORKUT*
University College Dublin
Abstract: This article takes the conservative shift in Polish politics under PiS 
as an example and argues that the failure of the liberal economy could end 
up reversing the fast-forward wave in human rights. And because Poland is a 
relatively new member of the EU, the article also develops the argument that 
such a reversal in the new member countries could make the European Un-
ion’s (EU) acquis irrelevant for further democratisation. Therefore, the article 
ﬁ rst explains how the failure of the economic liberalism of the neo-liberal mar-
ket economy paves the way for the success of conservative political parties. 
It then raises the question of why political liberalism, promoted by the EU’s 
human rights acquis, is also a target for the opponents of the market economy. 
The article concludes with a discussion of current Polish politics in the after-
math of the October 2007 elections.
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Introduction
Is it possible for economic liberalisation to lead to the contraction of civil rights? 
This article looks at the conservative shift in Polish politics under the PiS (Prawo 
a sprawiedliwość – Law and Justice Party) government from September 2005 to Oc-
tober 2007 in Poland as an example and argues that the failure of liberal economy 
could end up reversing the fast-forward wave in human rights. Therefore, rather 
than explaining the ascendance of PiS purely as a result of embedded conserva-
tism in Polish politics, the article depicts how conservative political parties can 
oppose economic and political liberalism in one package. Given that Poland is 
a relatively new member of the European Union (EU), this article also develops 
a subsidiary argument, that such a reversal in the new member countries could 
weaken EU accession criteria as a tool for democratisation. 
The Polish picture has repercussions beyond Poland. More recently, political 
conservatism has also found resonance in other countries of ‘new’ Europe. There 
are signs in Hungary, Latvia, and Slovakia that the conservative and populist po-
* Direct all correspondence to: Umut Korkut, University College Dublin, School of Politics 
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litical forces of ‘new’ Europe remain suspicious of extended rights and freedoms, 
despite the EU’s extensive legislation in the ﬁ elds of anti-discrimination, equality, 
and freedom of expression. The 2006 elections in Hungary saw numerous refer-
ences to the PiS victory in Poland. The leader of the opposition Fidesz, Viktor 
Orbán, on numerous occasions mentioned that PiS in Poland had prepared the 
scenario for Hungary to follow [Korkut 2007]. What started with PiS is that popu-
list parties in the new EU member states have begun to assess the regime change 
since 1989 as corrupt, degenerate, and unsuccessful. In order to ﬁ x the mistakes 
of transformation, these parties offer themselves as conservative alternatives, not 
only regarding economic liberalism but also political liberalism. 
In this respect, this article offers the following argument regarding the 
Europeanisation of human rights in the new member states. It is clear that EU 
membership is an important incentive for reform in the EU accession states. To 
this end, Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel [2003] showed that the material 
beneﬁ ts embedded in membership make the accession countries carry out im-
pressive reforms fast and swiftly. Cortell and Davis [2005: 4] argued that the EU 
accession states constituted a weak test of how international norms can change 
state behaviour through processes of internalisation, since strong material incen-
tives were embedded in the EU accession process. In contrast to both of these 
approaches, the article argues that two contingent factors of transition in Poland, 
such as Polish Catholicism and economic liberalism, react to and interact with 
the process of institutionalisation in a complex way. Thus, introducing market 
reforms can be a means of qualifying for EU accession, but at the same time they 
pave the way to political problems if they instigate corruption scandals and wide 
social inequalities and bring poverty to those who lack the necessary skills to 
catch up with the requirements of competitive economic systems. This is how the 
paper assesses the failure of the economic liberalism that was institutionalised in 
the new member states. 
This article has four parts. The ﬁ rst section sets out the background fac-
tors that inﬂ uenced the ascendancy of PiS. In the second section, I elaborate on 
manifestations of this conservative shift in Poland – namely, the election of PiS 
and its policies towards women’s and gay rights and freedom of the press – as 
examples of the diminishing civil rights in Poland. The conclusion summarises 
the argument put forth in the article and restates its wider implications for fur-
ther research. 
The background to the ascendancy of PiS 
In September 2005, with an electoral turnout barely above 40%, the Poles gave 
the majority of their votes to a centre-right party called PiS headed by the twins 
Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński. The party is based on Catholic, anti-communist, 
and conservative values. A month after this victory, in the second round of sepa-
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rate presidental elections, the electoral turn-out was just above 50%. The majority 
of those who actually bothered to vote chose the PiS candidate Lech Kaczyński. 
The populist Samoobrona (Self-Defense Movement) and the nationalist Catholic 
right-wing LPR (League of Polish Families) also entered the Sejm with, respec-
tively, 11.4% and 8% of the votes. These two parties entered into a coalition gov-
ernment with PiS in May 2006 after a brief period of supporting PiS in a minority 
government. These three parties were able to unite in their shared opposition to 
economic and social liberalism and suspicion of the European Union [Garton Ash 
2006; McManus-Czubińska et. al. 2003]. 
While PiS and its allies were subsequently defeated in the 2007 election by 
PO (Civic Platform), it still left an important legacy for Polish politics in particular 
and Central and East European politics in general. Its overtly anti-liberal stance 
towards human rights and its portrayal of the economic and political liberalisa-
tion of the transition years as the reason for the moral problems of Poland main-
tain this legacy. Furthermore, despite losing to the PO by 10 percentage points, 
votes for PiS were up by 6 percentage points from 2005. The increase in turnout 
between the 2005 and 2007 elections (when turnout was around 54%) partially ex-
plains the success of the PO. Also, the PO was the main beneﬁ ciary from the new 
voters of the post-1989 generation. It managed to secure 2.5 million votes from 
voters who had not participated in the previous election and around 1.5 million 
votes from voters who switched from other, mainly leftist, parties, which helped 
the PO’s chair, Donald Tusk, to win [Bugyinski 2006]. By the end of 2007, Donald 
Tusk was the prime minister of a coalition government formed between his PO 
and the PSL (Polish Peasant Party). 
During its government, PiS promoted historical constructivist, conserva-
tive propaganda. While in ofﬁ ce, Lech Kaczyński articulated his party’s stance 
towards the changes in Poland since 1989, assessing them as ‘degeneration’ and 
failed transformation (HetiVálasz, 2 March 2006). In order to cure the evils of trans-
formation, PiS politicians promoted a new orientation to politics that looks back 
and focuses on the past. PiS vowed to defend Polish morals against interference 
from the European Union and the party became critical of the morals of other EU 
countries. In his inaugural address, the then prime minister, Jarosław Kaczyński, 
deﬁ antly declared that Poland wanted to belong to the EU, but added: ‘We dif-
fer. There is no reason to hide this’. Kaczyński declared that they were ‘going to 
work so that Poland can retain its full sovereignty in culture and morals.’ These 
were references to the issues of abortion and women’s and gay rights in Poland 
(International Herald Tribune, 20 July 2006). And against the human rights of the 
European Union, Poland presented patriotism. Thus, the PiS version of conserva-
tism united four crucial elements in one basket: socialist economic thought, anti-
liberalism, Euroscepticism, and a dislike of Germany and Russia [Kosc 2005a]. 
Yet, how did this message attract voters in Poland? While PiS won its vic-
tory amidst the very low electoral turn-out in the 2005 elections, its road to power 
is still worth noting. Below, the results of CBOS (Public Opinion Research Centre) 
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opinion polls in Poland from three different periods shed light on the rise of PiS 
in terms of respondents’ feelings about democracy, freedoms, the economic sys-
tem, and Poland’s EU accession. 
What was speciﬁ c about the rise of PiS, however, was its message that the 
system put in place in Poland since 1989 is corrupt and has failed. And at the end 
of its government term, as the CBOS surveys show, those who were polled did 
not see any problems with the way democracy works in Poland. The respondents 
also noted that the ﬁ ght against corruption was one of the achievements of PiS. 
The ﬁ ght against degeneration, deviance, and corruption were, indeed, the most 
crucial aspects of the PiS programme. In order to depict how the corruption-
ﬁ ghter narrative of PiS was able to attract voters, below I present the CBOS opin-
ion poll results on corruption and the prosperity of the elite since the late 1990s 
and early 2000s in Poland. 
The CBOS opinion polls provide some background to PiS’s ascendance to 
power. However, the results provide only some evidence as to how PiS could 
gain support by means of its sceptical standpoint on political and economic lib-
eralism. The ascent of PiS into power had a new aspect: if traditional Catholic 
conservatism triggered a reaction to political liberalism, the reaction of PiS to eco-
nomic liberalism forged only more conservatism. PiS succeeded in transmitting 
a Eurosceptical message by articulating people’s concerns over a ‘corruption-rid-
den’ market economy, against which it offered a protective state that would ﬁ ght 
against corruption and wage a moral revolution to undo the wrongdoings that 
Table 1. Selected CBOS survey results on democracy, political liberalism, and the EU
Early 2000s Towards EU 
accession
  Since 2004
– February 2000: 
Freedom is 
important, but 
it is excessive in 
Poland.
Equality in 
social life refers 
to equal rights, 
equal chances of 
achieving a high 
social position, 
and similar living 
conditions.
Poland is quite 
lacking in equality.
– September 2003:
The main features 
of democracy are 
equality before the 
law, state guar-
antee of a decent 
living by the 
state, and equal 
education. These 
features do not 
exist in Poland. 
–  May 2005: No major gains from EU acces-
sion, a lack of better prospects for youth, 
open markets are not beneﬁ cial. 
–  May 2006: Religious faith is more important 
in life than freedom of speech. Homosexual-
ity is a deviation.
–  April 2006: Old members gained more than 
Poland from enlargement. Poland is an 
important country in the EU
–  June 2006: 34% dissatisﬁ ed with capitalism.
–  September 2007: Fighting corruption and 
public safety are the most signiﬁ cant 
achievements of PiS. 
–  November 2007 (end of PiS government): 
Democracy works in Poland. 
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had occurred since 1989. That was how inequality, corruption, and unemploy-
ment blamed on the economic liberalism of the neo-liberal transformation trig-
gered a conservative reaction to liberalism under the banner of PiS. Yet, this new 
aspect of Polish politics derived from the insistence of Kaczyński and others that 
just about everything the past post-communist governments had done was ei-
ther corrupt, infected with immoral practices, or inadequate for the defence of 
Poland’s interests.
In this attempt, PiS reﬂ ected a sceptical position towards political liberal-
ism especially in the areas of gender rights and freedom of expression. Its rise to 
power and the legacy it left behind show that PiS convinced the public of its own 
interpretation of the Polish transformation – or of its failure. Indicators of political 
liberalism are respect for individual rights and freedoms and the full application 
of the EU anti-discrimination agenda and safeguarding equality between differ-
ent social components. It is possible to regard a political regime’s view of gender 
rights and freedom of expression as prisms of political liberalism. However, this 
article does not argue that under the previous governments of Poland, political 
liberalism was comprehensively entrenched. The tenets of traditional Polish con-
servatism inevitably ﬁ nd space for themselves in PiS ideology. However, to re-
state, what is new to PiS’s conservatism is the way it used the narrative of failed 
transformation and economic liberalism to curtail political liberties. 
The article argues that the EU membership process was unable to fully en-
trench political liberalism in Poland, whereby the conservative political narrative 
Table 2. Selected CBOS survey results on corruption and prosperity in Poland
Corruption: Prosperity:
– June/August 2001: 
Two-thirds of respondents believed that 
corruption is a very big problem in Poland
70% believed that a large percentage of 
civil servants gain unjustiﬁ ed beneﬁ ts from 
their positions. The percentage of respond-
ents with a negative opinion of the honesty 
of a large proportion of civil servants has 
been growing steadily since 1995. 
Over one-half of respondents declared that 
the present government and the parlia-
mentary opposition are equally corrupt. 
– February 1999:
62% of respondents declared that the rich 
do not deserve high social regard, because 
‘nowadays in Poland it is impossible to 
make a fortune through honest work’.
Power and informal relations affect peo-
ple’s chances of prospering. 
The poor are ordinary people who work, 
but earn too little to provide sufﬁ cient 
ﬁ nancial means for themselves and their 
families. 
– February 2005: 
Privatisation beneﬁ ts dishonest people, 
fraudsters, government ofﬁ cials, and for-
eign capital. 
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suggested that the past political elites had not asserted Polish interests sufﬁ cient-
ly in the EU accession process and thus membership brought forward an identity 
gap between Poland and the EU. This gap had repercussions that affected the 
implementation of both the political and economic requirements of membership. 
This argument rests on my normative assumption that both the economic and the 
political dimensions of EU membership have equal weight. This normative as-
sumption, however, does not refute the argument that the post-accession imple-
mentation of the EU acquis can be obstructed by the political elite [Pridham 2008]. 
Rather than comparing the implementation of the economic and of the political 
acquis with each other, in the article I have chosen to illustrate how the implemen-
tation of the economic acquis and its underlying neo-liberalism led to reactions 
against both the political and economic acquis. In order to substantiate my point 
I concentrate on issues related to gender rights and freedom of expression in 
Poland as expressions of human rights issues. As I will demonstrate in the next 
section, the conservative shift in Poland was a manifestation of how the process 
of liberalisation, associated with the EU accession process, could lose ground in 
the new member states with the ascendance of conservative forces. 
Before proceeding to discuss the manifestations of the conservative shift in 
Poland, however, I will brieﬂ y state why the left failed to become a magnet for 
those frustrated with economic liberalism. This discussion may also explain why 
the Polish context has repercussions for some other new member states, notably 
Hungary and Slovakia. One feature central to the Polish context is that, unlike 
before, the people, tired of the economic uncertainty brought about by the free 
market, no longer vote for the left-wing parties. In the past, the Polish Democratic 
Left Alliance (SLD) traditionally gained 5–6 percentage points more of the vote, 
when the same voters who opposed putting the state enterprises into private 
hands to solve the economic problems of the country, unconditional closure of 
unproﬁ table factories, and supported the view that women should be allowed 
to have an abortion in the early days of pregnancy [Markowski and Toka 1993 
[1995]]. The 2005 election showed that PiS could push the SLD out of ofﬁ ce by 
referring to economic issues important to Polish voters and to the corruption in 
the market economy while at the same time devaluing the non-economic issues 
previously important to SLD voters. Similarly, the corruption associated with 
the market economy, resonated in the minds of voters as the failure of economic 
liberalism. PiS thus consolidated its supporter base using buzzwords like ‘law’, 
‘order’, and ‘corruption’ [Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008] against the degeneration 
that took hold during the Polish transition. 
Markowski and Toka [1993 [1995]: 85] deﬁ ned three relevant political at-
titudes in Poland: Christian-nationalist, liberal, and rightist attitudes after the 
regime change. The liberal attitude comprises: a) pro-market economic attitudes 
and b) liberal socio-cultural opinions. The Christian-national attitudes are char-
acterised by: a) an anti-market economic outlook and b) anti-liberal socio-cultural 
outlooks. The rightist attitudes comprise a) pro-market economic attitudes and 
b) anti-liberal, social and cultural outlooks. Thus, the growth in popularity of the 
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SLD stemmed from the shift in Poles’ attitudes in mainly one direction: liberalism 
versus Christian-national anti-liberalism. In other words, it was not a predomi-
nantly ‘leftist’ socio-economic ideology in Polish society that caused the growth 
in support for the SLD. According to Markowski and Toka, the PSL and other 
non-Solidarity parties (e.g. Samoobrona) disproportionately beneﬁ ted from the ex-
pansion of economically populist attitudes among Poles regarding the economy. 
In the absence of a left-wing party that would be concerned with social equal-
ity and welfare, Christian-nationalist-peasant parties substituted for the left in 
the politics of social equality starting in the mid-1990s. The failure of the SLD to 
respond to the demands of the electorate to solve income differences and corrup-
tion (CBOS Polish Public Opinion Survey in June 2003) brought PiS to power with 
its promises to ﬁ ght post-communist crimes of economic liberalism and to forge a 
strong state to cure the domestic sources of injustices of economic liberalism. 
In their seminal essay on the initial victory of the SLD in 1993, Markowski 
and Toka concluded that the advantageous circumstances for the secular-left type 
parties, arising from the radicalisation of the social and cultural background, 
would not last for long. Along with the failure of the SLD camp, the ideologi-
cal confusion of the ‘Solidarity’ discourse also contributed to the ascendance of 
the conservative forces in Poland. The prevailing conviction of Solidarity was 
that the ‘West’, seen as the only alternative to Soviet domination for Poland, was 
by deﬁ nition ‘capitalist’ and hence ‘anti-socialist’. Therefore, to be patriotic or 
‘politically correct’ in an anti-communist or non-communist environment meant 
being capitalist (see Markowski in Zarycki [2000]). The Polish picture shows that 
where there is economic weakness, and particularly where the state lacks the 
capacity for economic management or the provision of welfare, a representation 
gap regarding public preferences will open up [Whiteﬁ eld 2006: 737]. 
Also central to conservatism in Poland is the alliance between the Roman 
Catholic Church and the national opposition in their struggle against foreign 
 centres. To follow this tradition, PiS underlined its Euroscepticism with criticism 
of the cosmopolitan features of European integration and its libertarian propo-
nents in Poland. In this respect, it is safe to say that there was no social liberalisa-
tion in Poland in the ﬁ rst place because of the Catholic Church. However, a closer 
glance at the ascendance of PiS demonstrates that the critics of economic liberali-
sation also gained an opportunity to repeal political liberalism. 
Manifestations of the conservative shift in Poland
The return of the welfare state in Polish political discourse
The human costs of economic transition are high. The privatisation of state en-
terprises and the introduction of market prices, as well as competition from im-
ported Western goods, resulted in high unemployment and income inequality in 
Poland after 1989 [Paczynska 2005: 586]. As I showed above, general feelings of 
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2009, Vol. 45, No. 3
578
economic inequality are associated with the power and informal links of the elite, 
who also made disproportionate gains from the privatisation of state enterprises 
– an important feature of economic liberalism in the region. A sense of economic 
inequality goes hand-in-hand with low levels of satisfaction with democracy and 
freedoms. As the CBOS survey results above show, in Poland unfair competition 
from the West and the sale of state industries to foreigners became associated 
with neo-liberal impulses. Wałęsa put it very simply: under communism, people 
had security but no freedom, now they have freedom and hanker after security. 
Then they had enforced equality, now one person is a millionaire while others 
are in the gutter. And he adds that millionaires did not make their money in the 
cleanest way [Garton Ash 2006]. 
The EU membership negotiation phase did not see much discussion with 
respect to work conditions and remuneration or social welfare arrangements in 
the accession states. Foreign investors and national governments often collabo-
rated to preserve the speciﬁ c competitive advantage of the new member states, 
promoting the social differences between East and West as incentives for invest-
ment [Bohle 2005]. In this respect, the West came to stand for Western countries, 
international ﬁ nancial organisations, as well as the EU [Szalai 2001]. In Szalai’s 
[2001] words, this ‘alliance built between the political elite of the accession states 
and the Western political and economic elite’ ended up excluding the citizenry 
at large from the prosperity that the transition brought. Unlike Poland’s Europe-
anising elite, however, Lech Kaczyński was able to make it clear that he would 
use his presidential power to veto all attempts at further liberalising the Polish 
Labour Code [European Industrial Relations Observatory Online 2005]. And 
such statements certainly helped the electoral success of PiS. According to PiS’s 
conservative rhetoric, the conditions under which Poland joined the European 
Union were not good for the country’s economic development (International Her-
ald Tribune, 25–26 March 2006). This was the message that public opinion sur-
veys were already sending in the late 1990s, and PiS responded to the message 
from the polls with staunch criticism of liberalism. Overall, PiS proﬁ ted from the 
blurred picture of the EU, which the party portrayed as the source of neo-liberal 
economic reforms, making it the key culprit in the discourse on westernisation.
During the 2005 election campaign, Kaczyński perfected use of the word 
‘liberal’ in a negative context, implying – and often openly declaring – that the lib-
eralism of his main rival from the PO, Donald Tusk, would only beneﬁ t the rich. 
Lech Kaczyński stressed that it was the responsibility of the state to forge greater 
solidarity between those who have succeeded in the new capitalist Poland and 
those who have not. While in government, PiS brought various institutions on 
board the moral revolution it was promising. The establishment of a grand ‘Truth 
and Justice Commission’ to probe all the scandals of the post-1989 era was the 
ﬁ rst step [Kosc 2005b]. It was conceived as a response to the belief shared by many 
ordinary Poles that anyone who is rich must be a thief or a cheat (CBOS July-Au-
gust 2001) and thus to the corruption associated with economic liberalism. 
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More controversially, in April 2006, PiS launched the ‘Commission for 
Tracking Crimes against the Polish Nation’ (Le Monde, 27 June 2006). It was the 
task of this commission to inspect the political past of Polish politicians. One of 
the ﬁ rst politicians to resign was Zyta Gilowska, the liberally oriented Minister of 
Finance, who was confronted with growing suspicions that she had collaborated 
with the secret service under communism.1 Finally, PiS established the ‘Central 
Ofﬁ ce of Anti-corruption’ in order to audit all company ﬁ nance, including EU 
funds. By law it is within the authority of the prime minister, not the Sejm, to 
appoint the head of this ofﬁ ce, which raised doubts regarding its neutrality.2 Fi-
nally, the president signed legislation to start an investigation into the political 
backgrounds of 400 000 civil servants, including school teachers and journalists 
(HetiVálasz, 23 November 2006).3 It was not just PiS’s assault on the liberalism of 
the 1990s in Polish politics recounted above that drew interest, but the way in 
which PiS carried out the process. When the anti-corruption agency men struck, 
arresting everyone from allegedly crooked politicians to surgeons suspected of 
taking bribes from patients, they did it on television, wearing masks and dressed 
head to toe in black (The Guardian, 18 October 2007). 
PiS thus manifested itself as the judge of the legitimacy of the social order 
that succeeded real socialism. The Kaczyński brothers insisted that not enough 
had been done after 1989 to make a public reckoning with the communist past, 
to purge the security services, and to remove from public life the people who 
took part in the repression of the communist regime. That was how PiS usurped 
what Zarycki [2000: 859] previously referred to as the cultural cleavage in Polish 
politics over the communist past in an attempt to discredit the post-1989 political 
elite, while ascribing itself a moral duty to carry out lustration. In the absence of 
morality, the Polish state was left in crisis: it became weak, bloated, inefﬁ cient, 
and very prone to corruption. PiS presented a ‘Bermuda quadrangle’ of corrupt 
politicians, secret police operators, businesspeople, and criminals. The Kaczyński 
brothers and their advisers deftly combined these popular themes in their calls 
for a ‘moral revolution’ in Poland in order to restore ‘law’ to the Polish state and 
‘justice’ to Polish society [Garton Ash 2006]. Combating corruption is no obstacle 
to the implementation of the EU acquis. Yet, it is fair to ask how the PiS govern-
ment failed to implement the EU acquis on rights and freedoms while opposing 
economic liberalism?
1 The court declared Gilowska formally innocent. The court did not ﬁ nd any written au-
thorisation of recruitment nor did it ﬁ nd any reports. For further details of the case, see 
Chodakiewicz [2006], Retrieved 25 September 2006. http://www.worldpoliticsreview.
com/article.aspx?id=205
2 The ofﬁ ce can paralyse companies by asking too much or forcing them to go through an 
audit period of almost nine months. It is up to the politicians to decide which companies 
to check. See ‘Można ... Antykorupcyjne.’ (http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/1345117,11,1,1,,item.
html).
3 The Polish Constitutional Court later declared that the legislation was unconstitutional 
and the law was struck down in April 2007. 
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Diminishing political and civil rights 
When women and men regained their civic liberties after the change in regime 
in the post-communist countries, there was a naïve expectation that freedom and 
opportunity to act would grow and empower all citizens. It is apparent that this 
has not been the case [Chimiak 2000: 4] and the problems involved in securing 
gender rights illustrate the difﬁ culties of implementing the human rights acquis. 
Under PiS, however, Poland was the accession state with the most signiﬁ cant im-
plementation problems. 
Poland transposed the EU legislation on equal treatment for men and wom-
en and created an anti-discrimination watchdog as required by the EU by 2003. 
However, one of PiS’s ﬁ rst acts was to do away with the position of a gender-equal-
ity ombudsperson. The government said it would assign the anti-discrimination 
brief to a lower-ranking ofﬁ cial [Kosc 2005c]. The nomination of the Ombudsman 
for Human Rights was also not without controversy: Dr. Janusz Kochanowski’s 
nomination raised concerns about his objectivity and independence from the po-
litical ideas of his backers since he had been a candidate for the European Parlia-
ment under PiS in 2004. The Polish Federation of Women and Family Planning 
characterised the new ofﬁ ceholder as a highly controversial lawyer, known for 
his controversial approach to human rights, his well-known support for capital 
punishment, and his low tolerance for homosexuals.4 
After its EU membership, the Polish attitude towards population control 
also became crucial even beyond the EU proper. The fact is that the EU member 
states provide over two-thirds of the core funding for the United Nation’s Popula-
tion Fund (UNFPA). The European Commission also contributes to more speciﬁ c 
programmes.5 The position of Poland on these contributions could determine the 
future policies of UNFPA. An exhibition organised by conservative right-wing 
Polish Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) on the premises of Parlia-
ment revealed where the participating Polish MEPs stood as regards birth con-
trol. The exhibition titled ‘Life and Children in Europe Ofﬁ cial Opening of the 
Exhibition’, expressed opposition to abortion and the undertone of the exhibition 
was a comparison of women aborting children to people killing each other in 
peace time, backed up with quotations from Mother Theresa and pictures from 
concentration camps.
At this point, it is necessary to examine the position of the Catholic Church 
in Polish politics and the attitude of the Polish Catholic Church towards the EU. 
4 See Wanda Nowicka, ‘Disturbing Nomination.’ Polish Federation for Women and Family 
Planning. http://www.federa.org.pl/?page=news&newsid=71&lang=2 (27 January 2006).
5 See http://www.unfpa.org/eu_partnership/index.htm. While the conservative circles 
accuse UNFPA of promoting abortion under the guise of promoting ‘sexual and reproduc-
tive health services’, the UNFPA website explicitly notes that the organisation does not 
promote abortion. See http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2005/jul/05070404.html as an exam-
ple of conservative criticisms of the UNFPA. 
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Catholicism not only substantiated the ideology of PiS and its coalition partners 
in Poland, but also framed the way they approached gender rights. The politically 
active position of the Catholic Church drew criticism, sometimes even from the 
Vatican itself. While paying an ofﬁ cial visit to Poland in May 2006, Pope Bene-
dict XVI stated that Catholics expected their priests to mediate just the relationship 
between God and human beings. But they do not expect priests to be experts on 
the economy or politics (Magyar Hírlap, 26 May 2006). Still, neither the Polish past 
nor present can be understood without grasping the complexity of the Church’s 
presence and moral force in Poland, its notions of both the individual and the 
social order, its mixture of conservative ethics and progressive and nationalist 
politics, and the ongoing battle between Church and state – which both preceded 
and followed forty years of authoritarian communism [Davies 2001: 299–300]. 
As part of the dissidence movement, the Episcopate of the Roman Catholic 
Church along with radical intellectuals introduced Helsinki norms into constitu-
tional debates. In the post-1989 period, however, the inﬂ uential Catholic Church 
has sometimes been a challenge to Poland’s European project. The Church per-
ceives Western Europe as the source of secularisation, privatisation of religion, 
liberalisation, and the loosening of family values and national traditions, and 
sees it as a threat to Catholic values and traditions in Poland. In this connection, 
on 21 March 2002 the Polish Episcopate issued an ofﬁ cial document titled [Kon-
ferencja Episkopata Polski 2002], according to which the Catholic Church is 
supportive of unifying initiatives which respect those fundamental human rights 
that minister to the integral development of human beings and promote the common 
good of both nation and country […] the Universal Church and Catholic Church in 
Poland have been supportive of this process from the beginning. Europe in the eyes 
of the Church is not purely an economic and political structure, but primarily a 
historical and cultural community based on lasting ideas and tradition of Judeo-
Christian spiritual values, Roman law and Greek philosophy […] The resolutions 
worked out by the Convention to guarantee the fundamental right to life of every 
human being from conception until their natural death and the right of marriage as 
a permanent relationship between a man and a woman (Polish Bishops on European 
Integration). 
The deﬁ nition of marriage is contained in the 1997 Polish Constitution and 
the Church fears that under European Union law this provision might be chal-
lenged. Similarly, the Church is afraid that European integration may throw the 
door wide open to a weakening of the strict Polish anti-abortion law or even its 
complete liberalisation. 
Such ideas have been strongly articulated by Radio Maryja, a nationwide 
network that reaches as many as four million regular listeners and enjoys a vir-
tual monopoly on Catholic broadcasting in Poland. It became the focal point of 
anti-EU resistance during the late 1990s. The radio station and its newspaper out-
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lets were instrumental in securing Sejm seats for the LPR. Regarding the broad-
casting of Radio Maryja, the Polish writer Andrzej Stasiuk wrote the following in 
L’espresso:
I listened to Radio Maryja with strange fascination some time ago. Mostly, I listened 
to it at night when it went to a certain wave of phone conversations directly with the 
listeners. Prior to that, I had never listened to anything like that on any radio or tel-
evision. Simple people, the most ordinary people, called in. Poor, lonely, old people; 
from small villages in the provinces; pensioners, disabled, unemployed. All the col-
ours not considered by other programmes of broadcasting agencies; all those absent, 
forgotten, disadvantaged, and non-existent in the new, fantastic market economy. 
There were voices that we could hear on the bus, on the street, in the waiting rooms 
of hospitals, in the used-clothing stores, in the cheap food stores. They called the 
radio and talked sincerely about their lives, about loneliness, their feeling of becom-
ing useless. They talked about their own misery and sadness. They talked to Radio 
Maryja because no one else wanted to listen to them [Stasiuk 2006]. 
That was how Radio Maryja earned an active position in Polish politics as 
the public space. In comments that would have gone well with Radio Maryja’s 
audience, the prime minister of the ﬁ rst PiS-led government, Marcinkiewicz, told 
the station that his government would stand ﬁ rmly against abortion, in vitro con-
ception, and contraceptives. Marcinkiewicz also stated that he was not afraid of 
the European Union’s pressure to liberalise abortion policy [Kosc 2005a]. 
Beyond Radio Maryja, the voice of the Catholic Church can be overrep-
resented in the Polish media. The Media Act (Article 18.2) requires ‘respect for 
Christian values’. The Catholic Church is the only body outside the ‘National 
Radio and Television Broadcasting Council’ authorised to re-license radio and 
television stations to operate on frequencies assigned to the Church [Reporters 
without Borders 2003; US Department of State 2005]. During the accession talks, 
the European Commission remained silent on this issue and did not assess the 
Polish Media Act as a constraint on freedom of expression. PiS politicians made 
the best of the Catholic domination of the Media Act and demonstrated their 
intolerance of criticism. The Kaczyński brothers also showed their intolerance 
of criticism when the President cancelled attendance at a meeting between the 
Polish, German, and French presidents in Weimar intended to mark the 15th an-
niversary of the Weimar Triangle6 and asked for an ofﬁ cial apology from the Ger-
man government in response to a satirical report about them in Tageszeitung. 
Statute 132 was passed by the government of former Prime Minister Jarosław 
Kaczyński in 2006. It slaps a three-year prison term on anyone ‘publicly accusing 
the Polish nation of participating in, organising, or being responsible for Nazi or 
Communist crimes’. Jan Tomasz Gross, known for his critical stance on the role of 
the Poles during the Holocaust, was accused of slandering the Polish nation with 
6 Polskie Radio. http://www.polskieradio.pl/polonia/article.asp?tId=38784&j=2. 
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his new book Fear, which probes the murder of Jews in Poland after the end of 
the Second World War. In January 2008 the author came under investigation from 
public prosecutors in Krakow, where his publisher, Znak, is based. The prosecu-
tors looked into whether the book broke the law that makes slandering the Polish 
nation a crime (Der Spiegel Online, 18 January 2008). Yet, the existence of such a 
statute in an EU state was reminiscent of the previous, infamous Penal Code 301 
in Turkey that made slandering Turkishness a crime. 
Beyond freedom of expression, discrimination against sexual minorities in 
Poland became a major case of the EU’s failure to get its human rights legislation 
introduced in full in a member state. In this area as well, there is visible inﬂ u-
ence of the Catholic religion to demonise homosexuals as sick people. Yet, the 
conservatism of PiS triggered a reaction to political liberalism that went beyond 
traditional Catholic conservatism. 
The European Union has already stated that discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation may undermine the achievement of the objectives of the 
EC Treaty in the Preamble of the Amsterdam Treaty. According to the Lambda 
Warszawa Association, there are many cases of discrimination against sexual 
minorities in Poland [Abramovicz 2007]. These cases of discrimination relate to 
welfare provisions, rights of inheritance, limitations on the constitutional rights 
of lesbians and gays to express their opinions and to receive and distribute in-
formation. The latter stems from the obligation of the mass media to respect the 
‘religious beliefs of the audience, and in particular the Christian system of val-
ues’, which, as noted above, are often hostile towards homosexuality [Reporters 
without Borders 2003]. Another level of discrimination relates to the existence of 
regulations which make appointments to certain functions or the performance of 
certain professions dependent on the undeﬁ ned criteria of ‘integrity’ and ‘high 
morals’ [Lambda Warszawa Association 2005]. To deny someone a certain job on 
the basis of some characteristic that has no bearing on his/her ability to carry 
out the requirements of this job is one of the most sophisticated ways in which to 
degrade a person or make him/her feel worthless [Mohr 1997]. 
President Lech Kaczyński and the former Prime Minister Kazimierz Mar-
cin kiewicz pledged to take action against discrimination targeting gays. But in 
an interview shortly after his appointment, Mr. Marcinkiewicz described homo-
sexuality as ‘unnatural’ (BBC News, 12 June 2006). Previously, as the mayor of 
Warsaw, Lech Kaczyński had banned an ‘equality parade’ for gays and lesbians 
[Garton Ash 2006]. He took a ﬁ rm stance against homosexuals, who – he claimed 
– were ‘spreading an inappropriate lifestyle’ and he could not see any justiﬁ cation 
for propagating homosexual culture [Kosc 2005d]. The mayor of Poznan followed 
Kaczyński’s example and also banned a parade in November 2005. The organis-
ing committee of a gay pride parade in Poznan appealed at the Provincial Admin-
istrative Court after they were refused the necessary permission to organise it. 
The Provincial Administrative Court explained why ‘equality parades’ constitute 
a part of freedom of expression. In response to the appeal against the decision of 
the Mayor of Poznan and the Governor of the province, the court stated that the 
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aim of freedom of assembly is not only to grant independence and self-fulﬁ lment 
to individuals, but also to protect the social communication processes necessary 
for the proper functioning of a democratic society. Public interest is the underly-
ing factor of this protection. Freedom of assembly, apart from its public-legal as-
pect, belongs to the basic, fundamental political rights of humans [Śmiszek 2007]. 
The court’s decision thus afﬁ rmed that the right to organise ‘gay parades’ was 
central to freedom of assembly and therefore a fundamental aspect of human 
rights. Later, the European Court of Human Rights unanimously ruled in the 
‘Case of Bączkowski and Others v. Poland’ that the banning of gay parades in Po-
land was in violation of Articles 11, 13, and 14 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights and therefore it contravened freedom of assembly and association.7 
In reference to the situation of homosexuals in Poland under PiS, a Labour 
Member of the European Parliament, who is also the president of the European 
Parliament’s Intergroup on Gay and Lesbian Rights, Michael Cashman, stated 
that ‘we are ﬁ ghting battles that we thought we had won years ago in Europe 
once again’ (International Herald Tribune, 24 November 2005). While the Europe-
an Parliament passed a ‘Resolution on the Increase in Racist and Homophobic 
Violence in Europe’, it still sounded rather weak with respect to the situation in 
Poland, and was diluted by the grouping of various crimes in one resolution.8 
Nevertheless, the response from the Polish Parliament was very vocal: the Sejm 
passed a counter declaration, expressing the view that the European Parliament, 
which apparently made no particular independent study of the situation in Po-
land, does not know what it is talking about. Article 51 in the European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms underlines the fundamental responsibility 
of the member states with regards to implementing the norms of the Charter. 
Poland cannot be an exception.
In turn, Marcinkiewicz, in an interview, characterised the rights and freedoms 
embedded in the European system as ‘ideologised’. In response to a question 
about the rights of homosexuals in Poland and statements from certain politicians 
in his party regarding the re-introduction of capital punishment, Marcinkiewicz 
stated that the Polish Constitution guaranteed the rights of every citizen, and the 
institutions of democracy – the government among them – are the guardians of 
these rights. However, he continued, the Constitution also guaranteed the rights 
of families –understood as a relationship between a man and a woman. That was 
why he emphasised the need to protect families as a constitutional duty (Magyar 
Hírlap, 17 January 2006). 
7 See ‘Case of Baczkowski and Others v. Poland.’ European Court of Human Rights. 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highli
ght=Baczkowski%20%7C%20poland&sessionid=7659111&skin=hudoc-en (3 May 2007).
8 See ‘MEPs Adopt Resolution on the Increase in Racist and Homophobic Violence in Eu-
rope.’ European Parliament. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+IM-PRESS+20060608IPR08828+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (15 June 2006).  
Umut Korkut: Reversing the Wave
585
Marcinkiewicz’s ideas in particular and the stance of conservative right-
wing politicians in Poland in general show how the dominant group sees itself 
as the embodiment of universal values, which express ‘truth’ and ‘justice’ in an 
absolute sense. In this context, all other groups can be described as different, 
where different means deviant and therefore inferior treatment is justiﬁ ed [Fra-
ser 1996]. This attitude expresses the outlook on gender relations in Poland. Also 
prevalent has been the use of the neo-liberal option for economic change as the 
only solution to the economic crisis in Poland after the 1990s [Gowan 1995, 2005]. 
The liberal reformers presented neo-liberalism as the only solution to the coun-
try’s economic ills and regarded anyone who did not belong to their clique as 
useless [Ost 2005]. So far, these two prevalent perspectives in Poland have gone 
hand-in-hand owing to elite dominance in politics and the relative silence of the 
EU during the accession negotiations. 
Explaining the conservative shift in Poland 
During the decades in which Poland was consolidating its democracy, the ad-
vocacy of democracy became very closely tied to the endorsement of neo-liberal 
ideas about state-society relations – in particular, reliance on the market to guide 
economic priorities, minimisation of the social role of government, and encour-
agement of the maximum privatisation of economic life [Ost 2005]. The transition 
experienced pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
to build a high-growth economy, and the result was still the partial social disem-
powerment of the state. At the beginning of the transition in Eastern Europe, the 
European Union did not produce any alternative rhetoric to the demands made 
by international ﬁ nancial institutions on the accession states [Gowan 1995], de-
spite its parallel attempts to install ‘social Europe’, while instituting a competitive 
economic system. Polish politics is a crucial example of the complex conﬂ uence of 
political conservatism, with Catholic themes and economic liberalism as contin-
gent factors affecting the institutionalisation of human rights. 
Critics of European integration accused the EU of having an economic pro-
gramme that favoured only economic freedom and competition. In this light, the 
critics designed the Treaty of Rome as an economic neo-liberal constitution, the 
aim of which was to protect market freedom from public power. However, Eu-
ropean integration was also conceived as a safeguard of the welfare state. In the 
latter perspective, the European Union is a new forum in which social rights, 
which are no longer viable at the national level owing to economic competition 
among states, are re-introduced. Therefore, looking at the balance between eco-
nomic freedom and social rights in the EU, we ﬁ nd a very broad conception of 
social rights. They include provisions that do not have the status of fundamental 
rights in national constitutions [Maduro 1999: 449]. However, it is very difﬁ cult 
for the EU to make member states abide by these provisions and the Commission 
Reports on Poland prior to its accession demonstrate this inability. 
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The ensuing economic problems in the new member states also show that 
the EU accession did not necessarily offer solutions to the social and ﬁ nancial 
problems associated with the transition to a market economy. While EU integra-
tion has brought accelerated economic growth to the new member states, the lev-
el of economic inequality is also increasing. Economic development is ultimately 
advantageous for the bigger cities, but its effect is less signiﬁ cant for the smaller 
towns and the countryside [Eurostat Regional Yearbook 2007]. 
There has been little expectation among the Polish population that joining 
the EU would solve poverty. On the eve of accession, 46% of respondents in one 
survey expected that poverty levels would most likely increase after Poland be-
came a member, while only 16% anticipated that EU membership would decrease 
poverty levels. Those with less education and living in small towns and the coun-
tryside tend to be more critical of the changes and more nostalgic for socialism 
[Paczynska 2005: 590, 597]. These ‘losers’ in the transition process comprise the 
core of PiS voters and hence anti-liberalism ﬁ nds resonance among Polish voters. 
Nevertheless, initially Polish liberalism did not mean just market capital-
ism. Ost [2005: 98] writes that liberalism also meant ‘promoting gender equality 
and minority rights, or at least recognising that such values were now a requisite 
part of the (pro-Western) world order. It meant anti-racism and, for most, an ac-
ceptance of gay rights.’ Nonetheless, the crucial point is that the liberals pro-
moted political liberalism as tied to the defence of economic liberalism. All the 
grand ideals of human rights and civil society, they believed, depended ﬁ rst and 
foremost on the eradication of state ownership and government subsidies and the 
introduction of a capitalist economy with hard budget constraints. That was how, 
over time, political liberalism simply became secondary for Polish liberals and 
the ideals of the neo-liberal market economy became the dominant discourse. In 
this article I argue that this gave ample opportunity to their opponents from the 
conservative camp to reject both the goals of economic and political liberalism in 
one package. PiS excelled in offering counter-liberalisation on both the political 
and economic fronts. 
Ost [2005: 99, 101, 114] argues that in Poland the liberals got it wrong: it is 
not capitalism but the way capitalism is challenged that underpins democracy. 
In the end, political liberalism is endangered by tying it too closely to economic 
liberalism. Therefore, although the new post-communist elite sought to create 
both a democratic polity and a capitalist market economy, it saw only the second 
of those aims as especially difﬁ cult. That was how their approach became dis-
ingenuous, ineffective, and detrimental to the consolidation of liberal politics. 
Finally, the liberals lost when they squandered their moral and political authority 
by adopting such a hostile attitude to their labour base; they created a base that 
came to identify political liberalism with arrogance on the one hand and eco-
nomic liberalism on the other. In the end social exclusion became closely linked 
to economic exclusion and thus poverty. 
The failure of liberalism to bring about equal opportunities in Poland since 
the beginning of the regime change and its recoiling from an active state brought 
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to power a political party that wished to correct the wrongdoings of the transi-
tion. At the same time, issues such as sexual orientation and gender rights were 
let out of the closet. The liberalism intrinsic to the Polish transition provided 
the representatives of gay-lesbian and women’s rights with chances to instigate 
broadly based debate and contestation. Yet, what was missing from this debate 
was criticism of economic liberalism as regards increasing poverty and inequal-
ity. As Ost [2005] states, these criticisms came from the populists with conserva-
tive political ideas. 
The result is that people dismissed the promises of political liberalism and 
turned towards conservative parties with the hope of seeing an active state to 
correct inequalities and corruption. In this way the failure of economic liberalism 
contributed to conservatism with Catholic undertones against the implementa-
tion of human rights norms. This is not to say that up until PiS’s ascendance 
to power gender rights were guaranteed. Nevertheless, what is clear is that the 
ascendance of PiS to power put these rights more at risk. And even Poland’s EU 
membership failed to secure the full implementation of human rights owing to 
the PiS factor in Polish politics. The 2007 elections brought defeat to PiS, but the 
party simultaneously saw an increase in the number of votes it received. 
Difference in opinion on various issues is nothing new to the member states 
of the Union; it is almost more the norm than it is a novelty. Nevertheless, adher-
ing to the highest standards of human rights is a fundamental requirement for ac-
cession to the EU. While issues such as social rights and gender rights do not fall 
under the most basic deﬁ nition of human rights [Falk 2000], they still compose a 
fundamental part of the EU human rights acquis. It is signiﬁ cant that in June 2006 
the organisers of Warsaw’s annual ‘Equality Parade’ for gay rights wore t-shirts 
which read ‘Europe=Tolerance’ (BBC News, 12 June 2006). The unanimous deci-
sion that the European Court of Human Rights reached in the case of Bączkowski 
and Others v. Poland showed that the court considered gay parades fundamen-
tally related to freedom of expression. Given the extent of human rights prob-
lems in Poland in the area of gender rights, the President of the EU Commission, 
Manuel Barroso, felt the need to emphasise anti-discrimination on the basis of 
sexual-orientation in the EU acquis. During ex-Prime Minister Marcinkiewicz’s 
visit to Brussels, Barroso said that in EU member states the Charter of Human 
Rights is the standard, and it states that everyone has the right of assembly, re-
gardless of sexual orientation (Figyelő, 1–7 December 2005). 
Conclusion 
Using the example of PiS in Poland, this article demonstrated that populist con-
servative political parties oppose liberalism – both economic and political – as 
a package in the new EU member states by drawing attention to the discontent 
that was caused by the transformation to and consolidation of neo-liberalism in 
the CEE states. In order to support this argument, I described the political pic-
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ture in Poland before PiS’s electoral victory. I showed the popular reactions and 
responses to the issues that in the public mind were associated with the market 
economy, such as privation, corruption, and the undeserved prosperity of the 
elite. My discussion of the reaction of PiS to political liberalism rested on my 
observations of the rhetoric of its leadership on gender rights and freedom of ex-
pression. I consider both of these issues as signiﬁ cant components of the political 
liberties required for EU membership. 
The article does not test the relative importance of the economic and po-
litical aspects of the EU acquis against each other, but assesses them as issues of 
equal importance and weight in the enlargement process. Similarly, in discuss-
ing the impact of the failure of economic liberalism to instigate a reaction to the 
all-encompassing liberal agenda of the EU, I do not seek to detach the domestic 
and the international causes of such a failure. Rather, I approach the issue of 
such a failure from the point of view of the respondents of opinion polls in order 
to show it was not necessarily the identiﬁ able causes but the whole process of 
fraud, the undeserved prosperity of the elite, degeneration, and the corruption 
associated with the economic transition that contributed to their reaction. I situ-
ated PiS as a reactionary force to liberalism in one package and illustrated how 
its reaction to economic liberalism forged more conservatism in Poland. In effect, 
the conservatism of PiS became speciﬁ c for the way in which it used the narrative 
of failed transformation to curtail political liberties.
The Polish case of PiS should offer a warning to the proponents of a com-
petitive market economy in the western Balkans and the Middle East as a pre-
condition for democracy. If differences and rifts have already appeared between 
the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ members of the EU in a matter of only a few years since 
enlargement, this could suggest that the Copenhagen criteria for accession are 
not adequate and comprehensive enough to prepare the accession countries for 
EU membership. The growing distance between Brussels and Warsaw under the 
PiS-led coalition government was a major blow to the continuance of Copenha-
gen criteria. The article showed that, despite the various problems of social and 
gender rights in Poland even prior to accession, the EU kept a close eye on many 
issues. The EU should therefore re-deﬁ ne its accession conditions before it starts 
to consider enlargement towards countries with more serious human rights and 
economic problems, such as Turkey and Croatia. 
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